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A COLLEAGUE'S OBSERVATION ... 
JEROME FRANK AS PROPHET: COURTS ON 
TRIAL REVISITED 
In 1949, legal philosopher and fed-
eraljudge Jerome Frank published his 
most important legal treatise, Courts 
On Trial. J Widely received as a com-
prehensive and incisive criticism of 
our trial courts, the book sought to 
eliminate the mystery surrounding the 
courthouse and propose much needed 
change to the judicial system. "My 
principal aim," Frank wrote in his pref-
ace, "is to show the major importance 
of [trial] courts; how they daily affect 
the lives ofthousands of persons; and 
how, most often with tragic results, 
they do their job in ways that need 
reform." 
In the forty-three years since its 
debut, Courts On Trial has proven 
remarkably prophetic. The influx of 
television programs with law discussed 
ostensibly as their subject has removed 
much of the mystery from the field of 
law. These programs have shown us 
litigation, negotiation and titillation of 
all kind. However, Frank's specific 
criticisms of our legal culture remain 
relevant and his proposed reforms have 
either been adopted or are again being 
discussed by judges and bar associa-
tions throughout the country. It is 
therefore helpful to today's debate to 
review Frank's theory as argued in his 
literary tour de force. 
Frank's fundamental jurisprudence, 
a form oflegal realism, can be summa-
rized in his signature phrase, "facts are 
guesses." In other words, the Ameri-
can justice system frequently fails be-
cause of mistakes in fact finding. Many 
of these mistakes, Frank acknowl-
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edges, are simply attributable to hu-
man nature. An honest witness may 
erroneously observe, recollect, or ar-
ticulate the facts, or may be uncon-
sciously swayed by subtle subliminal 
biases. Further, a dishonest witness 
might commit perjury. These mortal 
failings and faulty observations are 
then filtered through a second tier of 
interpretation, the finder of fact 
(whetherjudge orjury), with their own 
similar weaknesses. While Frank con-
ceded that no system can overcome 
witnesses who lie, forget, or allow 
prejudices to color memory, he also 
opined that a high percentage of mis-
takes in fact finding actually derive 
from defects in our methods of getting 
at those facts, such as the adversary 
system, the use of juries, the relative 
unaccountability of our fact finders, 
and the inherent advantage enjoyed by 
the State in criminal prosecutions. 
Regardless of the source of factual 
mistakes, Frank argued thattheirpreva-
lence makes it virtually impossible for 
even well-trained lawyers to predict a 
court's decision in any given case. 
Attorneys, however, find the reality of 
this subjectivity intolerable, and hence 
perpetuate two myths to impose order 
on the court system. M)1h Qn.e: Re-
gardless of the actual facts, a rule of 
law exists to dictate the court's deci-
sion. M)1h I.wQ: Even ifthe trial court 
renders a bad decision, the appellate 
court is a safety net that will itself 
apply the correct rule to the facts. Frank 
concludes that both fictions are falla-
cious. What good is a legal rule, he 
asks, if the facts to which we are apply-
ing the rule are wrong? Further, how 
remedial is an appellate court when it 
too is basically constrained by the fac-
tual findings of the trial court? The 
short answer is that the justice system 
must reject these rationalizations and 
concentrate on improving fact finding. 
Frank's proposed reforms read like 
a checklist of what plagues the judicial 
system today. His recommendations 
included that courts institute "talking 
movies" of trials; use non-partisan 
"testimonial experts" called by judges; 
encourage trial judges to actively ex-
amine witnesses; require special edu-
cation for prosecutors - a type of moral 
fitness test emphasizing the obligation 
of a prosecutor to obtain and bring out 
all evidence, including anything ex-
culpatory; and require similar training 
of police to guard against "third de-
gree" interrogations. His most com-
prehensive and novel reforms, how-
ever, pertain to legal education, the 
jury system, and the role of the trial 
judge. 
Legal Education 
Frank argued that the legal rule and 
upper-court myths owe their continued 
existence to American legal education. 
He frequently complained ofthe "neu-
rotic-escapist" character of contempo-
rary law schools, with their over-em-
phasis on the library, appellate opin-
ions, and legal theory instead of the 
reality of practice: 
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The law students are like fu-
ture horticulturists studying 
solely cut flowers; or like fu-
ture architects studying merely 
pictures of buildings. They 
resemble prospective dog-
breeders who never see any-
thing but stuffed dogs. Per-
haps there is a correlation be-
tween such stuffed-dog legal 
education and the over-pro-
duction of stuffed shirts in my 
profession. 
This form of detached legal education 
owes its beginning to Harvard Dean, 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, a bril-
liant recluse who rarely went to court 
and therefore deluded himself into be-
lieving that law is a science and a 
library the laboratory. "What qualifies 
a person to teach law," Langdell wrote, 
"is not experience in the work of a 
lawyer's office, not experience in deal-
ing with men, not experience in the 
trialorargurnnentofcauses,notexperi-
ence in learning law .... " As a result, 
long after Langdell, law students are 
taught by professors who often know 
very little about being lawyers. 
Ironically, the method oflegal train-
ingthatLangdel1 replaced was, in truth, 
superior. The colonial law student was 
essentially an intern; an apprentice who 
"read law" in the office of a practicing 
attorney. He was in daily intimate 
contact with courts and law offices. 
"Before his eyes, legal theories re-
ceived constant tests in legal practice." 
Arguing that the profession was dam-
aged by the abandonment of the ap-
prentice system, Frank presented spe-
cific reforms to improve the curricu-
lum. 
Frank first suggested that most law 
schoolteachers possess five to ten years 
experience practicing law. This would 
end the perpetual cycle ofthe book-law 
teacher producing not lawyers, but other 
book-law teachers, ad infinitum. Next, 
Frank proposed that the law school 
"case system" should be modified to 
replicate the case history style used in 
medical schools. This would allow 
law students to read and examine the 
14 - The Law Forum/22.3 
complete record of the dispute, rather 
than just analyzing the appellate opin-
ion. 
Frank also used medical schools as 
a model for proposing a supplement to 
the texts. He advocated frequent visits 
by the law student to both trial and 
appellate courts. "What would we say 
of a medical school," he wonders, 
"where students were taught surgery 
solely from the printed page?" Like a 
resident internship at a hospital, Frank 
suggested that law schools operate le-
gal clinics where students could pro-
vide free services to those in need 
while simultaneously learning the hu-
man side of the administration of jus-
tice, including the hazards of jury tri-
als, how legal rights are affected by 
lost papers, missing witnesses, perjury 
and prejudice, the effects of "fatigue, 
graft and laziness," on judges, and real 
draftsmanship. 
In short, Frank believed students 
could be taught to read a case in six 
months. The remainder of the three 
year law school experience is wasted. 
Supporters ofthe Langdell method ar-
gue that book-law analysis does no 
harm, and students will eventually learn 
the real legal facts in practice. Frank 
effectively dispelled this tepid argu-
ment by countering that students are 
essentially miseducated by receiving 
or forming an erroneous, ivory-tower 
impression ofthe ways courts and law-
yers behave. He finally asks, ''what 
kind of education is it that has to be 
undone?" 
The Jury System 
For ages the jury system was viewed 
as the great achievement of English 
and American jurisprudence. The jury, 
according to lore, finds facts and then 
uses legal reasoning to apply to those 
facts the legal rules it learned from the 
judge. Frank, however, rejects this 
theory as naive and labels juries ''the 
skeleton in the judicial closet." He 
proposed his own "realistic" theory: 
that jurors often ignore the facts, defy 
the law, and "determine that they want 
Jones to collect $5,000.00 from the 
railroad company, or that they don't 
want pretty Nellie Brown to go to jail 
for killing her husband; and they bring 
in their general verdict accordingly." 
Cases are decided according to what 
the jury supposes the law ought to be, 
and the jury therefore becomes not 
only the judge but the legislature in a 
"court house government." Further, 
the general verdict (guilty ornot guilty, 
liable or not liable) hide the jury's 
errors by keeping from view their de-
liberations. 
Frank does not condemn jurors for 
this failure. Juries simply do not un-
derstand what they are told by the 
judge about the legal rules. Given that 
the law is often incomprehensible to 
attorneys, we obviously ask too much 
of the jury. If, by chance, the jury 
understands the rules, they still face 
formidable obstacles in ascertaining 
the facts. In addition to the normal 
problems highlighted by Frank's fact 
skepticism,juries often need computer-
like memories to assemble and sepa-
rate evidence which may by too eso-
teric or scientific to begin with, and 
must overcome what Frank called the 
''thirteenth juror" - prejudice. Frank 
concluded that ''there is probably more 
wool-gathering in jury boxes than in 
any other place on earth." 
As a solution, Frank bluntly pro-
posed abandoning jury trials except in 
major criminal cases. Alternatively, 
he recommended several changes to 
the jury system, including the special 
verdict, which compels the jury to make 
specific findings offact to which a trial 
judge may apply an appropriate rule. 
Frank believed that this would ensure, 
at least to some degree, a reasoned 
verdict rather than an emotional re-
sponse. Frankalso suggested the "spe-
cial jury." If a case relates to a particu-
lar business, trade or profession, Frank 
recommended empaneling a jury con-
sisting of citizens engaged in the same 
business, thus reSUlting in a more in-
formed jury. Next, Frank believed the 
court should employ its own objective 
expert to report on the facts and form 
an opinion that the jury may take or 
leave. Frank would also abolish most 
of the civil exclusionary rules; hetheo-
rized that such rules often keep out 
important evidence without which the 
actual past facts cannot be detennined. 
Frank further suggested recordingjury 
deliberations so that the Court could 
determine whether the verdict was 
reached by improper means. Finally, 
Frank recommended citizen training 
for jury service consisting of courses 
that track the function of the jury and 
nature of trial court fact finding. Such 
a requirement might mitigate the class 
warfare that is currently conducted in 
today's urban courtroom. 
The Role of the Judge 
In response to his rhetorical ques-
tion, "Are judges human?" Frank an-
swered an empathic "Yes." That real-
ity, as much as any other, affects the 
fact finding process: 
[The judge's] own past may 
have created plus or minus re-
actions to women, or blonde 
women, or men with beards, 
or Southerners, or Italians, or 
Englishmen, or plumbers, or 
ministers, or college-graduates 
or Democrats. A certain facial 
twitch or cough or gesture may 
start up memories, painful or 
pleasant. Those memories of 
the trial judge, while he is lis-
tening to a witness with such 
facial twitch or cough or ges-
ture, may affect the judge's 
initial hearing, or subsequent 
recollection, of what the wit-
ness said, or the weight or 
credibility which the judge will 
attach to the witness' testi-
mony. 
Combine the judge's idiosyncracies 
with his very human attention span, 
and the impediments to accurate judi-
cial fact finding are evident. More-
over, the judge often feels compelled 
to obscure her findings and subsequent 
decision in a legal opinion that is basi-
cally undecipherable. 
Much of the obscurity is due to 
what Frank tenns "robism," or ''the 
cult of the robe." The use of the robe, 
which did not become standard in the 
United States until the late 1800's, 
provides equal prestige to the worthy 
and unworthy. It creates an air of 
mystery about the bench and thereby 
shields judges and their methods from 
rational inquiry. "Robism" similarly 
affects court opinions. "The conven-
tions of judicial opinion writing, " Frank 
observed, ''the uncolloquial vocabu-
lary, the use of phrases carrying with 
them an air of finality, the parade of 
precedents, the display of seemingly 
rigorous logic, bedecked with 
'therefores' and 'must be trues' lendan 
air of thorough certainty, concealing 
the uncertainties inherent in the judg-
ing process." Believing that courts 
have an obligation to make themselves 
intelligible to the average citizen, Frank 
advocated the literal and metaphorical 
abandonment of the robe, relying on 
the somewhat dubious beliefthat"plain 
dress may encourage plain speaking." 
To otherwise help improve their 
perfonnance, Frank suggested special 
training for trial judges. In light of the 
almost irreversible weight given judi-
cial fact finding, it is imperative that 
they be prepared to do their job will. 
The would-be judge should first de-
velop solid litigation experience as a 
trial lawyer, including an apprentice-
ship with a trial judge. He should be 
educated in psychological devices use-
ful in testing the trustworthiness of 
witnesses. More importantly, Frank 
believed the prospective trial judge 
should undergo "something like a psy-
choanalysis" to explore his own preju-
dices and biases in an attempt to over-
come them. Additionally, Frank sug-
gested that the future trial judge be-
come aware not merely of his preju-
dices, "but also of the factors which 
peculiarly affect his capacity for sus-
tained attention, so that he can avoid 
inattention when witnesses testify be-
fore him." Finally, prior to appoint-
ment, the trial judge should be required 
to pass a "stiff examination" of her 
legal ability and moral character. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the importance of 
Courts On Trial transcends its specific 
reforms. In the midst of McCarthy's 
America, Jerome Frank undertook an 
assault on the most sacred of our gov-
ernmental branches by attacking the 
myth ofthe court's divinity. Byexpos-
ing the warts of the judicial system, 
Frank promoted beneficial changes, 
including videotaped trials, law school 
clinics, practical legal education, and 
the humanization of the bench. In-
deed, while some ofthe weaknesses in 
our courts that Frank noted still exist 
today, they are nevertheless more ac-
cessible and frankly fairer than forty 
years ago. Courts On Trial arguably 
initiated that improvement, and will 
hopefully inspire continued attempts 
to perfect the process. 
Endnote 
1 Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (1949) 
(First Princeton Paperback ed., 
Princeton University Press 1973). 
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